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Abstract
High performance networks (e.g. Infiniband) rely on zero-copy operations for performance. Zero-copy
operations, as the name implies, avoid copying buffers for sending and receiving data. Instead, hardware
devices directly read and write to application specified areas of memory. Since modern high-performance
networks can send and receive at nearly the same speed as the memory bus inside machines, zero-copy
operations are necessary to achieve peak performance for many applications.
Unfortunately, programming with zero-copy APIs is a giant pain. Users must carefully avoid using
buffers that may be accessed by a device. Typically this either results in spaghetti code (where every
access to a buffer is checked before usage), or blocking operations (which pretty much defeat the whole
point of zero-copy).
We show that by abusing memory protection hardware, we can offer the best of both worlds: a simple
zero-copy mechanism which allows for non-blocking send and receives while protecting against incorrect
accesses.
To make things concrete, consider an MPI computation that as part of it’s operation maintains a distributed
table. Each worker might have code like this:
// map from int to a big blob
hash_map<int, Buffer[1024]> table;
PutRequest put;
GetRequest get;
while (1) {
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, PUT_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(peer, PUT_REQUEST, &put, sizeof(put));
memcpy(table[put.key], put.value);
}
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST, &get, sizeof(get));
world.Send(peer, GET_RESPONSE, table[get.key]);
}
}
(Naturally each worker will probably be doing something else in addition to maintaining their table.) This
is fairly straightforward, but inefficient code; the blocking send operation prevents the worker from doing
anything else until the current get request completes.
We’d like to switch to use the non-blocking (ISend) primitive for effiency. A first attempt at this might
look like:
list<Request> pending;
while (1) {
...
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST, &get, sizeof(get));
pending.push(world.ISend(peer, GET_RESPONSE, table[get.key]));
}
// remove any finished sends
check_for_completed(&pending);
Of course, after running this (or if we’re smart, before running it), we realize that there is a possible
conflict between our put and get requests. We can now handle multiple simultaneous sends, but what if we
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get a put request for a key k that we’re in the middle of sending? If this is the only place where table is
used, then we can address this by keeping track of the active keys :
hash_map<int, bool> active;
while (1) {
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, PUT_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(peer, PUT_REQUEST, &put, sizeof(put));
while (active[put.key]) { check_for_completed(&pending, &active); }
memcpy(table[put.key], put.value);
}
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST, &get, sizeof(get));
active[get.key] = 1;
pending.push(world.ISend(peer, GET_RESPONSE, table[get.key]));
}
// remove any finished sends + clear pending bits
check_for_completed(&pending, &active);
What if our table is used elsewhere in our program? Then we are forced to either guard every access to
the table with a check on our pending table which leads to ugly, hard to maintain code. If we have multiple
threads reading the table this becomes even worse; requiring a lock around any accesses, which can severely
compromise performance.
It would be nice if we could somehow “protect” any table cells that are still being sent. Writes to protected
cells would block as appropriate until sends are finished:
...
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(ANY_SOURCE, GET_REQUEST, &get, sizeof(get));
protect(table[get.key]);
pending.push(world.ISend(peer, GET_RESPONSE, table[get.key]));
}
// check for finished requests and unprotect
check_for_completed(&pending, &table);
We can get part of the way there by utilizing the memory protection hardware present on our system
(exposed via the mprotect system call):
void protect(buffer) {
// we have to align to page boundaries for mprotect
page_start = align(buffer.ptr)
prot_len = buffer.size + (buffer.ptr - page_start)
mprotect(page_start, prot_len, PROT_READ);
}
This marks a buffer as read-only. Any writes to it will result in a protection fault. On it’s own, this is
not very useful (except perhaps as a debugging tool to find errant writes). We can do better by registering
a signal handler for protection (segmentation) faults. Our handler is given the memory address that caused
the fault; we just need a mapping of address ranges that are in use:
struct Op {
MPI::Request req;
void *start;
int len;
};
hash_map<void*, Op> active;
void handler(int signal, siginfo_t* info, void* ctx) {
Op& op = get_op(active, info->si_addr);
while (!op.req.Test()) {
yield();
}
unprotect(op);
}
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We can wrap up sending and memory protection for convenience:
void send_and_protect(int dst, int tag, Buffer b) {
// we have to align to page boundaries for mprotect
page_start = align(buffer.ptr)
prot_len = buffer.size + (buffer.ptr - page_start)
Op op = { world.Isend(dst, tag, b), page_start, prot_len };
active[page_start] = op;
mprotect(page_start, prot_len, PROT_READ);
}
That’s it! Now whenever a writer tries to touch a protected area they will simply block until the request
is finished. Our code for handling put requests reverts to the original form:
...
if (world.Iprobe(ANY_SOURCE, PUT_REQUEST)) {
world.Recv(peer, PUT_REQUEST, &put, sizeof(put));
memcpy(table[put.key], put.value);
}
The locking of the active regions is now implicit. Even better, we’ve also protected any other areas of our
program which might try to write to our table.
Note that our memory protection boundary is conservative. Hardware works on pages (typically 4kbytes)
of memory at a time; by aligning our buffers to page boundaries, we end up blocking operations that don’t
necessarily conflict with our sends. This is not a correctness issue, but it will result in some writes being
blocked unneccesarily.
There are some obvious improvements we can apply at this point. We don’t want to use this technique if
our messages are one-byte long: not only will the overhead be far too high, our false-positive rate will also
skyrocket. A sensible strategy would be copy messages less then a certain threshold and use protection only
on larger messages.
Conclusion
Example code, including an implementation of the above technique and performance tests is available online
here: http://github.com/rjpower/zero-copy
Related Work
There are, of course, many uses (and abuses) for paging and memory protection; too many to list them all
here. Treadmarks [1] uses the same protection trick to alias distributed shared memory onto the existing
host address space. Hardware memory protection has been used as a basis for building transactional memory
systems [2]. Various malloc debuggers use memory protection to identify reads and writes to freed memory.
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